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Abstract
A strategy proﬁle of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if
it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of
the speciﬁcation of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions
in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust
stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-
response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for
the subclass of supermodular N-player binary-action games. For the
mistakes model, robust selection results obtain for best-reply dynamics
in the same class of games under the weaker condition of strategic com-
plementarity. Further, both the selection of risk-dominant strategies in
coordination games under best-reply and the selection of “Walrasian”
strategies in aggregative games under imitation are robust.
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11 Introduction
The concept of stochastic stability was introduced in Game Theory in a
series of seminal papers by Blume (1993), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993),
Young (1993), and Ellison (1993). In the meantime, a large number of
applications have been developed, a series of theoretical improvements have
ensued, and several striking results have been proven relying on this concept.
Among the best known results, we single out three which have had a lasting
impact in the literature. First, the selection of risk-dominant equilibria (even
in the presence of alternative, Pareto-eﬃcient ones) in coordination games
(Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995; Sandholm, 1998)
under best-reply or imitation dynamics. Second, the selection of potential
maximizers in exact potential games in logit-response dynamics (Blume,
1993, 1997). Third, the selection of Walrasian equilibria in oligopolies with
imitating ﬁrms (Vega-Redondo, 1997), which has been shown to generalize
to the class of aggregative games by Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania (2005). These are
all important insights which have shaped our understanding of equilibrium
(and non-equilibrium) selection and stability.
The literature has also made a number of weaknesses apparent, some of
which have the status of unwritten “folk wisdom”. The main weakness of
the stochastic stability literature as a whole is probably the fact that many
results might depend, or might be perceived to depend on modeling details,
thereby casting doubt on the main insights gained from this approach. A
number of failed robustness checks have demonstrated this issue. We would
like to argue that, while some of these checks are substantial and have further
sharpened our intuition, other have arisen due to a fundamental lack of
robustness in the very concept of stochastic stability.
Among the substantial results we count the analysis in Robson and Vega-
Redondo (1996), which showed that the selection of risk-dominant equilibria
under the imitation dynamics of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) depends
on the postulated interaction structure, with “round-robin” interaction lead-
ing to risk-dominant equilibria but true random matching favoring Pareto-
eﬃcient ones (this distinction would not exist if myopic best-reply is as-
sumed). In our opinion, this result does not correspond to a weakness in
2the general approach. On the contrary, it is a substantial contribution that
points at the importance of the interaction structure and should not be con-
sidered a robustness check. Indeed, the importance of both the interaction
structure and the behavioral rule for equilibrium selection has been made
apparent in the related literature on games in networks (see Weidenholzer,
2010 for a review). For instance, Morris (2000) shows that best-reply dynam-
ics lead to risk-dominant equilibria in quite general networks, while Al´ os-
Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008) show that imitation favors Pareto-eﬃcient
outcomes under comparatively mild conditions on the network.
Among the more worrying failed robustness tests we count the fact that
changing the speciﬁcation of either revision opportunities or tie-breaking
assumptions might sometimes inﬂuence the long-run outcomes in a given
dynamic speciﬁcation. This aﬀects, for instance, the well-known result that
the original logit dynamics of Blume (1993, 1997) selects potential maxi-
mizers in exact potential games. Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer (2010) have shown
that this result depends crucially on the assumption of asynchronous learn-
ing, that is, a dynamic speciﬁcation in which every period one and only one
agent is selected and allowed to revise his or her strategy, while all other
players are required to stay put. If this assumption is dispensed with and
more general revision processes are allowed for, the result vanishes away.
Tie-breaking assumptions are also not always harmless. Suppose that a
behavioral rule speciﬁes the set of strategies that a player might choose from,
e.g. the set of payoﬀ maximizers given other players’ strategies (as in the case
of a myopic best-reply dynamics) or the set of strategies leading to currently
maximal, observed payoﬀs (as in the case of an imitation dynamics). Even
abstracting from revision opportunities, this still does not fully specify the
dynamics. One might for instance require that all maximizing strategies be
chosen with positive (maybe equal) probability; it might, however, be equally
reasonable to postulate that players who are already employing one of the
optimal strategies do not switch away. These are all reasonable choices,
which sometimes have consequences for the dynamic analysis (contrast e.g.
Oechssler, 1997 and Al´ os-Ferrer, 2003; see also Sandholm, 1998).
Both the speciﬁcation of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assump-
tions might be argued to be orthogonal to the analysis of the long-run pre-
3dictions associated to a given behavioral rule and interaction structure. It
is precisely for this reason that the possible dependence of long-run predic-
tions on them is an important consideration. A result which depends on
such modeling details should not be considered to be on equal grounds with
a result which is immune to the speciﬁcation thereof. In the present research,
we aim to provide and apply a simple result which helps establish when a
long-run prediction is robust to the speciﬁcation of revision opportunities
and/or tie-breaking assumptions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the general framework for the analysis. Section 3 introduces the robustness
concept and presents the main result. Section 4 presents a ﬁrst application to
evolutionary stability and aggregate-taking behavior for perturbed imitation
dynamics. Section 5 analyzes N-player binary-action games both for the
logit-response dynamics and the popular best-reply mistakes model. Section
6 discusses the limits of the approach and Section 7 concludes.
2 Learning in Games: A General Framework
2.1 Stage Model
Consider a ﬁnite population of N agents who repeatedly interact in discrete
time t = 1,2,... according to a pre-speciﬁed stage model, formalized as a
ﬁnite, normal-form game Γ = (I,(Si,ui)i∈I), where I = {1,2,...,N} is the
set of players, Si are the strategy sets, and ui : S → R are payoﬀ functions,
where S =
 
i∈I Si. We let S−i =
 
j =iSj be the set of pure strategy proﬁles
of all players except i, and we also write s = (si,s−i) and ui(si,s−i).
The strategies chosen and the stage model determine the payoﬀs agents
receive at the end of the period t. The stage model can simply be taken to be
an arbitrary, asymmetric N-player game, as in Blume (1993) or Al´ os-Ferrer
and Netzer (2010), or it can incorporate additional structure. For example,
it might specify that agents play a bilateral ﬁnite game sequentially against
each other agent in the population (round robin tournament), as in Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob (1993) (hereafter KMR), where the bilateral game is a
symmetric 2 × 2 coordination game.
42.2 Behavioral Rules and Correspondences
The game is played by boundedly rational players, whose behavior is sum-
marized by behavioral rules. At the beginning of each period, a certain
subset of agents is chosen to update their actions (we will further specify re-
vision opportunities below). Each player chooses a pure strategy according
to a pre-speciﬁed behavioral rule Bi : S  → ∆Si. That is, Bi(s)(s′
i) is the
probability with which player i will choose strategy s′
i ∈ Si after the proﬁle
s ∈ S has been played.
A simple behavioral rule which has been extensively studied in the lit-
erature of learning in games is the myopic best-reply rule, where players are
assumed to be able to compute best-replies to the current proﬁle of strate-
gies of their opponents, and choose one of them. In games with alternative
best-replies, the need for tie-breaking gives rise to a family of rules. That
is, a rule BBR
i is a best-reply rule if
BBR
i (s)(s′
i) > 0 =⇒ ui(s′
i,s−i) ≥ ui(s′′
i,s−i) ∀ s′′
i ∈ Si. (1)
Let us call Γ a symmetric game if Si = Sj = S0 for all i,j ∈ I and
payoﬀs are given by a symmetric mapping, i.e. the payoﬀ of a player choosing
strategy si against the proﬁle of strategies s−i is ui(si,s−i) = u(si|s−i),
where the latter is invariant to permutations of s−i. For symmetric games,
a second prominent example of behavioral rule (or, rather, family thereof),
is given by imitate-the-best rules as in KMR, Vega-Redondo, 1997, or Al´ os-
Ferrer and Ania, 2005, where players just adopt one of the strategies leading
to the highest, currently observed payoﬀ. That is, again taking into account
the need for tie-breaking assumptions, a rule BIB




i) > 0 =⇒
s′
i = sj for some j ∈ I with
uj(s) ≥ uk(s) ∀ k ∈ I.
(2)
Note that, formally, a rule might rely on the payoﬀ functions in order
to specify the strategies to be chosen, but the interpretation on the actual
knowledge of the game that players have might be very diﬀerent. In a best-
reply rule, the use of the payoﬀ function amounts to assuming that players
do know the payoﬀ function and can use it to (myopically) optimize their
5behavior. In the case of an imitation rule, the use of the payoﬀ function is
just a modeling device capturing the informational assumption that players
observe realized payoﬀs, but do not necessarily know the game or are able
to perform optimizing computations.
The description of both the best-reply and the imitation rule allows for
diﬀerent tie-breaking assumptions. We will now provide a formal approach
to their speciﬁcation. A behavioral correspondence for player i is a corre-
spondence   Bi : S ։ Si. That is,   Bi(s) is the set of strategies s′
i ∈ Si which
player i might choose after the proﬁle s ∈ S has been played. A behavioral
rule Bi is said to agree with a behavioral correspondence   Bi if
Bi(s)(s′
i) > 0 =⇒ s′
i ∈   Bi(s) (3)
for all s′
i ∈ Si and all s ∈ S. For instance, myopic best-reply rules as in (1)
are those agreeing with the best-reply correspondence
  BBR
i (s) = {s′




Imitate-the-best rules as in (2) are those agreeing with the imitation corre-
spondence
  BIB
i (s) = {s′
i ∈ Si | s′
i = sj for some j ∈ I with uj(s) ≥ uk(s) ∀k ∈ I}.
Given a behavioral correspondence   Bi, we say that a behavioral rule
Bi agreeing with   Bi is reasonable if Bi(s)(si) > 0 whenever si ∈   Bi(s),
where si is player i’s strategy in the proﬁle s, and Bi(s)(s′
i) > 0 for all
s′
i ∈   Bi(s) whenever si / ∈   Bi(s). With a reasonable behavioral rule, players
who ﬁnd their current behavior to be optimal according to the behavioral
correspondence will not abandon it for sure (although they might also not
stick to it for sure). Also, the rule respects anonymity of the strategies in
the sense that only the consequences of their use matter, as evaluated by
the correspondence.1 Let Ti denote the set of all reasonable behavioral rules
that agree with a given correspondence   Bi (we suppress dependency of Ti
on   Bi for notational convenience).
1Lexicographic conditions as e.g. choosing the most popular action in case of ties can
be built into the behavioral correspondence.
6Now consider two reasonable behavioral rules B1
i and B2
i from Ti. We say
that B1
i is (weakly) more sluggish than B2
i , written B1
i   B2





i) > 0, for all s′
i ∈ Si and all s ∈ S. That is, the support of
B2
i is always weakly larger than the support of B1
i . We say that the two rules
are equally sluggish, written B1
i ≃ B2
i , if B1
i   B2
i and B2
i   B1
i , so that the
sets {s′
i ∈ Si | B1
i (s)(s′
i) > 0} and {s′
i ∈ Si | B2
i (s)(s′
i) > 0} always coincide.
By construction, the relation ≃ is a binary equivalence relation on Ti. In
the following, we will informally identify two behavioral rules if they are
equally sluggish, i.e. if they diﬀer in speciﬁc (strictly positive) probabilities
assigned to strategies, but not in their support. Formally, we work in the
quotient set Ti/ ≃, on which the sluggishness-relation   becomes a partial
order.
Among all rules in Ti, we consider two distinguished rules (modulo equal
sluggishness). The cautious rule B0
i is the rule which speciﬁes B0
i (s)(si) = 1
whenever si ∈   Bi(s). That is, under the cautious rule a player will always
stick to his or her current action if this is one of the optimal ones according
to the behavioral correspondence   Bi. The random tie-breaking rule BX
i is
the rule given by BX
i (s)(s′
i) > 0 for all s′
i ∈   Bi(s), that is, all strategies
that are optimal according to   Bi are always chosen with strictly positive
probability. The following observation is now immediate.
Lemma 1. Any reasonable behavioral rule Bi satisﬁes B0
i   Bi   BX
i .
That is, the poset Ti/ ≃ has a top and a bottom element. It is straight-
forward to show that it is actually a complete lattice.
Finally, we denote proﬁles of reasonable behavioral rules for all players
by B = (Bi)i∈I ∈ T :=
 
i∈I Ti. Consider the product order on T , i.e.
B1   B2 if and only if B1
i is weakly more sluggish than B2
i for all i ∈ I.
Then we also obtain B0   B   BX for any reasonable proﬁle B ∈ T and
the two extreme proﬁles B0 = (B0
i )i∈I and BX = (BX
i )i∈I.
2.3 Revision opportunities
A learning dynamics for a game Γ is made of a behavioral rule for each player,
which includes tie-breaking assumptions, and a speciﬁcation of revision op-
portunities, i.e. a way of determining which players receive the opportunity
7to update their actions in a given period. Intuitively, revision opportunities
are closely related to the speed of the dynamics. A dynamics where only
one agent is allowed to revise per period is more gradual than one where the
whole population might switch away simultaneously, enabling abrupt tran-
sition phenomena. We consider a general class of revision processes which
encompasses a wide range of possibilities.
Definition 1. A revision process is a probability measure q on the set of
subsets of I, P(I), such that
∀ i ∈ I, ∃J ⊆ I such that i ∈ J and qJ > 0 (4)
where, for each J ⊆ I, qJ = q(J) is interpreted as the probability that exactly
players in J receive revision opportunities (independently across periods).
This deﬁnition is taken from Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer (2010). Condition
(4) implies that each player gets the opportunity to revise with strictly
positive probability. A revision process is called regular if qi = q{i} > 0 for
all i ∈ I, so that for each player there is a strictly positive probability of
being the only player who is allowed to revise. Let Q denote the set of all
regular revision processes.
Analogously to the previous section, we can deﬁne a binary relation  
on Q as follows.2 For any q,q′ ∈ Q we say that q′ is (weakly) quicker than
q, written q   q′, if qJ > 0 implies q′
J > 0 for any J ⊆ I. That is, the
revision process q′ includes more possibilities than q. Say that q and q′ have
the same speed, written q ≃ q′, if q   q′ and q′   q. By construction, the
relation ≃ is a binary equivalence relation. Consider again the quotient set
Q/ ≃, where two revision processes belong to the same class if and only if
they have the same speed, i.e. they diﬀer in speciﬁc probabilities assigned
to player subsets J ⊆ I, but not in their support. We will again identify
two processes that have the same speed and treat   as a partial order.
Among all processes in Q, we again consider two distinguished elements
(modulo equal speed). The asynchronous learning process qAL satisﬁes
qAL
J = 0 whenever |J| ≥ 2. The independent learning process qIL, on the
2We use the same symbols for the binary relations on T and on Q for convenience.
8other hand, satisﬁes qIL
J > 0 for all J ⊆ I.3 The following observation is
now again immediate.
Lemma 2. Any regular revision process q satisﬁes qAL   q   qIL.
Therefore the poset Q/ ≃ has a top and a bottom element as well. It is
again a simple exercise to show that it is actually a complete lattice.
2.4 Stochastic Stability
Starting from a proﬁle of behavioral rules B, we can apply a noise process to
derive associated proﬁles of behavioral rules with noise Bε = (Bε
i)i∈I, where
ε ∈ (0,1) measures how strongly players’ behavior is perturbed from B.4
For the ﬁrst noise process that we consider, the mistakes model, we ﬁx a
noise rule Ei : S  → ∆Si for every player i ∈ I, where Ei(s)(s′
i) is independent
of s and satisﬁes Ei(s)(s′
i) > 0 for all s′
i ∈ Si. Then each player’s behavioral






i) = (1 − ε)Bi(s)(s′
i) + εEi(s)(s′
i). (5)
For instance, the best-reply version of the well-known KMR model, ﬁrst
studied in Kandori and Rob (1995), proceeds exactly like this to derive
the best-reply with mistakes B
BR,M,ε
i from an unperturbed best-reply rule
BBR
i . As ε → 0, behavior converges to the best-reply rule. The noisy version
B
IB,M,ε
i of an imitate-the-best rule BIB
i can be constructed analogously.5
Importantly, the tie-breaking assumptions implicit in BBR
i or BIB
i carry over
to the noisy rules when the mistakes approach is used. When we start from
3These concepts are again taken from Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer (2010). The model of
Blume (1993) postulates qi = 1/N and is therefore an instance of asynchronous learning.
Independent inertia as in Sandholm (1998), where qJ = p
|J| (1 − p)
N−|J| for some p > 0,
is an instance of independent learning. The simultaneous learning process, where qI = 1,
is the simplest example of a process which is not regular.
4See Bergin and Lipman (1996) for a general treatment of (state-dependent) noise
processes and their selection properties.
5The original KMR model can be readily interpreted as a model of imitation (see KMR
p.31, Rhode and Stegeman, 1996, and Sandholm, 1998) where agents mimic the actions
which led to highest payoﬀs in the last period. In a celebrated result, KMR show that
their dynamics select risk-dominant equilibria, rather than payoﬀ-dominant ones, in 2×2
symmetric coordination games.
9a behavioral correspondence such as   BBR
i or   BIB
i , for instance, the mistakes
model associates to every behavioral rule Bi ∈ Ti a distinct behavioral rule
with noise Bε
i, which converges to Bi as ε → 0. We say that noise processes
with this property respect tie-breaking.
The second noise process that we will consider is the logit choice func-
tion, which has been used in the literature to obtain noisy versions of the
best-reply dynamics (see e.g. Blume, 1993 or Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer, 2010).
Formally, the probability of player i choosing s′
i given s only depends on the











Again, all actions are chosen with strictly positive probability whenever
ε > 0, and choice concentrates on myopic best-replies as ε → 0. The logit
perturbation, however, leaves no freedom in tie-breaking assumptions. As
ε → 0, the behavioral rule B
BR,L,ε
i converges to the speciﬁc best-reply rule
that breaks ties with equal probabilities. The logit approach is therefore
not suited to associate a distinct noisy rule to every Bi ∈ Ti for a given
behavioral correspondence   Bi. By using logit choice, we rather select a
speciﬁc Bi ∈ Ti (the one with equal tie-breaking).6 We say that noise
processes with this property impose tie-breaking.
Other particular examples of noise processes could also be considered.
For instance, Myatt and Wallace (2003) and Dokumaci and Sandholm (2008)
consider dynamics based on a probit choice function, which, as in the case
of logit, impose tie-breaking. Sandholm (2010) considers general “noisy
revision protocols” (where the word revision is used in a diﬀerent sense as in
this paper) including the mistakes model and logit and probit choice. The
two prominent examples presented above are those for which we develop
speciﬁc applications later in this paper.
Now consider any perturbed learning dynamics (Bε,q) derived from an
unperturbed dynamics (B,q) according to some noise process. Suppose that
all Bε
i have full support whenever 0 < ε < 1, as in the examples above. Then,
6One could also study the logit perturbation B
IB,L,ε
i of an imitate-the-best dynamics
B
IB
i , which would converge to the equal tie-breaking imitation rule as noise vanishes.
10the perturbed dynamics becomes an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain











and it has a unique invariant distribution, denoted  ε. A strategy proﬁle
s ∈ S is stochastically stable if limε→0  ε(s) > 0. Stochastic stability for
the mistakes model can be characterized along the lines introduced in KMR
or Young (1993), with a useful “radius-coradius” suﬃcient condition devel-
oped by Ellison (2000). Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer (2010) provide an analo-
gous, general characterization for the logit-response dynamics, and a similar
radius-coradius result.7
3 Robustness
We are interested in the following two concepts of robustness. First, suppose
we consider a given proﬁle of behavioral rules with noise Bε, based on some
underlying proﬁle of unperturbed behavioral rules B. Hence we treat as ﬁxed
a speciﬁcation of tie-breaking assumptions. This is always the case when the
noise process imposes tie-breaking, as with the logit-response dynamics, but
it can be done for any behavioral rule and noise process as detailed above.
Robustness now refers to the speciﬁcation of revision opportunities alone.
Definition 2. Fix a proﬁle of behavioral rules with noise Bε. A state s ∈ S
is robustly stochastically stable for Bε if it is stochastically stable for any
regular revision process q ∈ Q.
Second, suppose we consider a proﬁle of behavioral correspondences   B =
(   Bi)i∈I, with T being the set of proﬁles of reasonable behavioral rules that
agree player-wise with   B. For each B ∈ T we then apply a noise process that
respects tie-breaking to associate a distinct proﬁle with noise Bε. The prime
example is the mistakes model. Robustness then refers to the speciﬁcation
of both tie-breaking assumptions and revision opportunities.
7Several earlier contributions have studied logit behavior for special classes of games
or dynamics (e.g. Blume, 1993, 1997; Maruta, 2002; Myatt and Wallace, 2008a,b).
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process that respects tie-breaking. A state s ∈ S is robustly stochastically
stable for   B and the noise process if it is robustly stochastically stable for
all Bε that the noise process associates to the elements of T .
We will now provide a method that allows us to identify robustly stochas-
tically stable states. We ﬁrst introduce the following auxiliary concepts.
Definition 4. A monotone operator on revision processes is a mapping
T : Q × S  → R
(q,s)  → Tq(s)
such that Tq(s) ≥ Tq′
(s) for all s ∈ S whenever q   q′.
Analogously, we can deﬁne monotone operators with respect to both
revision opportunities and tie-breaking rules as follows. Fix a proﬁle of be-
havioral correspondences   B, which induces the set T . Consider the product
order on T × Q, i.e. (B,q)   (B′,q′) if and only if B   B′ and q   q′.
Definition 5. A monotone operator on revision processes and tie-breaking
rules is a mapping
T : T × Q × S  → R
(B,q,s)  → TB,q(s)
such that TB,q(s) ≥ TB′,q′
(s) for all s ∈ S whenever (B,q)   (B′,q′).
In contrast to the usual approach, we will not deﬁne radius and coradius
from a primitive such as cost (Ellison, 2000) or waste (Al´ os-Ferrer and Net-
zer, 2010). The only property of the diﬀerent radius and coradius concepts
that we need in the following is that they are monotone operators that yield
suﬃcient conditions for stochastic stability.
Definition 6. Fix a proﬁle of behavioral rules with noise Bε. A radius-
coradius pair (R,CR) for Bε is a pair of monotone operators on revision
processes such that, whenever Rq(s) > CRq(s) for some s ∈ S, it follows
that s is the only stochastically stable state for revision process q and Bε.
12It is easy to see that the existing radius and coradius concepts are in fact
radius-coradius pairs in the sense of this deﬁnition. For instance, the radius
of Ellison (2000) for the mistakes model is essentially the minimal number
of mistakes needed to leave the basin of attraction (under the unperturbed
dynamics) of a state. If one considers a revision process that enables more
transitions, the transitions which realize the minimum under the previous
dynamics are still feasible. Hence the minimum can only become weakly
smaller. Similarly, the coradius of Ellison (2000) is the maximum across
states s′ outside the basin of attraction of s, of all the minimum number
of mistakes required for transitions from s′ to the basin of attraction of
s. Again, if a revision process allows for more transitions, the minima can
only weakly decrease and the maximum among all the minima can only be
weakly smaller than before. The reasoning for logit-response is analogous,
with the number of mistakes replaced by the utility diﬀerences between
the chosen actions and the myopically optimal ones. Once monotonicity
is established, the fact that the property embodied in the deﬁnition above
is fulﬁlled follows from the radius-coradius theorems in Ellison (2000) and
Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer (2010).
When we start from behavioral correspondences   B and a noise process
that respects tie-breaking, we can deﬁne analogous concepts.
Definition 7. Fix a proﬁle of behavioral correspondences   B and a noise
process that respects tie-breaking. A radius-coradius pair (R,CR) for   B
and the noise process is a pair of monotone operators on revision processes
and tie-breaking rules such that, whenever RB,q(s) > CRB,q(s) for some
s ∈ S, it follows that s is the only stochastically stable state for revision
process q and the proﬁle Bε associated to B by the noise process.
Again, the radius and coradius due to Ellison (2000) satisfy these re-
quirements when the noise process is the mistakes model. The intuition for
monotonicity provided for Deﬁnition 6 also applies here, because we enable
more transitions when we make tie-breaking less sluggish.
The following proposition embodies the main idea behind our results.
13Proposition 1. (i) Fix a proﬁle of behavioral rules with noise Bε. Let
(R,CR) be a radius-coradius pair for Bε. Let q1,q2 ∈ Q with q1   q2. If




then for any q with q1   q   q2, s is the unique stochastically stable state.
(ii) Fix a proﬁle of behavioral correspondences   B and a noise process
that respects tie-breaking. Let (R,CR) be a radius-coradius pair for   B and
the noise process. Let (B1,q1),(B2,q2) ∈ T × Q with (B1,q1)   (B2,q2).




then for any (B,q) ∈ T × Q with (B1,q1)   (B,q)   (B2,q2), s is the
unique stochastically stable state (for the proﬁle Bε associated to B).
Proof. We prove statement (ii). Statement (i) is proven analogously. Con-
sider an arbitrary (B,q) ∈ T × Q with (B1,q1)   (B,q)   (B2,q2). It




which implies the statement by deﬁnition of radius-coradius pair.
Using part (i) of this result and Lemma 2, we obtain an immediate
corollary which delivers a simple condition for robust stochastic stability
given a behavioral rule with noise.
Corollary 3. Fix a proﬁle of behavioral rules with noise Bε. Let (R,CR)




then s is the unique robustly stochastically stable state for Bε.
This corollary applies directly to the logit-response dynamics or to any
mistakes model for pre-speciﬁed tie-breaking assumptions. The result states
that establishing robust stochastic stability is just as simple (or just as com-
plex) as establishing stochastic stability with the help of a radius-coradius
14result. The only diﬀerence is that one must focus on asynchronous learning
for computing the coradius and on independent learning for computing the
radius.
Using part (ii) of Proposition 1 and Lemmas 1 and 2, we also obtain an
immediate corollary about robustness with respect to tie-breaking rules in
addition to revision processes.
Corollary 4. Fix a proﬁle of behavioral correspondences   B and a noise
process that respects tie-breaking. Let (R,CR) be a radius-coradius pair for




then s is the unique robustly stochastically stable state for   B and the noise
process.
Hence, even when we require robustness to cover both revision processes
and tie-breaking assumptions, a radius-coradius result applies. Again we
need to focus on two diﬀerent, focal dynamic speciﬁcations only.
4 Symmetric Games and ESS
Consider a symmetric game Γ as deﬁned above. Relevant examples include
Cournot oligopolies, rent-seeking games, and other classes of games (see
Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005 for further details). Following Schaﬀer (1988,
1989), a strategy s∗ ∈ S0 is a strict, globally stable ESS (where ESS stands
for “Evolutionarily Stable Strategy”) if for all s′ ∈ S0, s′  = s∗,
u(s∗|s′, m ...,s′,s∗,...,s∗) > u(s′|s′, m−1 ... ,s′,s∗,...,s∗) (8)
for all m ∈ {1,...,N −1} . In words, a globally stable strategy earns larger
payoﬀs than any alternative strategy in any proﬁle where only those two
strategies are present. In the case of a Cournot oligopoly, the Walrasian
quantity has been shown by Vega-Redondo (1997) to be strictly, globally
stable, and stochastically stable in imitation-based dynamics with mistakes.
This result has been extended by Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania (2005) as follows.
First, any strict, globally stable ESS in a symmetric game is stochastically
15stable in a mistakes dynamics with imitate-the-best and independent inertia;
Al´ os-Ferrer and Schlag (2009) observe that this result holds for an even
broader class of imitation rules. Second, strict global stability, which might
seem a restrictive concept, includes a family of outcomes of special interest.
Informally, an aggregative game is a symmetric game such that players’
payoﬀs depend only on the own strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. It
is quasi-submodular if the own strategy and the aggregate exhibit an ordinal
substitutability (see Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005 for details). In every quasi-
submodular, aggregative game (which again includes Cournot oligopolies,
rent-seeking games, and other examples), strict global stability follows from
a more economic concept, Aggregate-Taking-Strategy, i.e. the generalization
of Walrasian equilibrium where each player maximizes payoﬀs taking the
aggregate of all strategies as given.
Here we show that strict, globally stable ESS (and hence aggregate-
taking strategies in quasi-submodular, aggregative games) are actually ro-
bustly stochastically stable for imitation dynamics and the mistakes model.
In other words, the associated selection result is robust to the speciﬁcation
of both revision opportunities and tie-breaking rules.
Proposition 2. Let s∗ be a strict, globally stable ESS of a symmetric game.
Consider the proﬁle of imitation correspondences   BIB = (   BIB
i )i∈I. Then
(s∗,...,s∗) is robustly stochastically stable for   BIB and the mistakes model.
Proof. We will rely on Corollary 4 and radius-coradius from Ellison (2000).
Consider the dynamics with independent learning and random tie-breaking.
If one mutant appears at the state (s∗,...,s∗), inequality (8) with m = 1
indicates that s∗-players earn strictly more than the mutant. Hence, tie-
breaking is irrelevant and one mutation is not enough to leave the basin of
attraction of (s∗,...,s∗). We conclude that RBX,qIL
(s∗,...,s∗) > 1.
Consider now the dynamics with asynchronous learning and cautious tie-
breaking. It is easy to see that it suﬃces to consider monomorphic states
(s,...,s) for the calculation of coradius. For any such state with s  = s∗,
if a single mutation to s∗ occurs, by inequality (8) with m = N − 1, we
obtain that the mutant earns strictly more than the incumbents. In the
asynchronous learning dynamics, if the mutant is selected to revise, the
16state will remain unchanged. Eventually, an incumbent will be selected and
switch to s∗. By (8) with m = N −2, the next incumbent to be selected will
also switch to s∗. Iterating, the dynamics will reach the state (s∗,...,s∗)
and we conclude that CRB0,qAL
(s∗,...,s∗) = 1. The conclusion follows from
Corollary 4.
This results strengthens the ones in Vega-Redondo (1997) and Al´ os-
Ferrer and Ania (2005) and shows that the relevance of the concept of strictly
globally stable ESS due to Schaﬀer (1988, 1989) for imitation models goes
beyond particular modeling assumptions.
5 Symmetric Binary Action Games
5.1 Notation and Deﬁnitions
Now let Γ be a symmetric binary action game (see e.g. Kim, 1996; Maruta,
2002; Blume, 2003), where the players’ strategy sets are given by Si =
{A,B}. Symmetry implies that each player’s payoﬀ depends only on the
own action and on the number of opponents choosing each action.8 Thus,
given a strategy proﬁle s ∈ S, denote by m(s) ∈ {0,...,N} the number of
players choosing action A in s. Let πA(n) be the payoﬀ of an A-player given
that n players choose action A altogether (including the respective player
herself), and let πB(n) be the payoﬀ of a B-player if n players are choosing
A. We can then write the payoﬀ functions as
ui(A,s−i) = πA(m(A,s−i)) (9)
and
ui(B,s−i) = πB(m(B,s−i)). (10)
Furthermore, we deﬁne ∆(n) := πA(n)−πB(n−1) for 1 ≤ n ≤ N as the
payoﬀ change of a player who switches from action B to action A, given that
n − 1 of the opponents choose action A, so that the overall number of A-
players is n after the switch. Throughout, we assume that ∆(n)  = 0 for some
8Sandholm (2010) also considers symmetric binary action games, concentrating on the
asymptotics as noise vanishes and population size goes to inﬁnity. Staudigl (forthcoming)
follows the same approach for asymmetric binary action games.
17n, i.e. we exclude the trivial case where the players’ payoﬀs are completely
unaﬀected by their own choice of action. We consider two examples.
Example 1. Consider a unanimity game (e.g. Young, 1998a, Section 9) where
πB(0) > 0 and πA(N) > 0, but πA(n) = 0 if n < N and πB(n) = 0
if n > 0. The game has two strict Nash equilibria,   A = (A,...,A) and
  B = (B,...,B). In addition, every state s ∈ S with 2 ≤ m(s) ≤ N − 2 is a
non-strict Nash equilibrium. The diﬀerence function ∆(n) of the unanimity
game is given by ∆(1) = −πB(0), ∆(n) = 0 for all 2 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, and
∆(N) = πA(N).
Example 2. The unanimity game can be generalized in diﬀerent ways. As
a particularly interesting example for our purpose, consider a team project
game with two projects, A and B, where each of the N players must partici-
pate in exactly one of the projects. Participation is costless, but the success
of project A requires the participation of at least nA ≤ N players, while
project B is successful if and only if at least nB ≤ N players participate.
Assume further that nA + nB > N + 1, which implies that the two projects
cannot be realized jointly, and that there is the possibility that none of them
is successful. If project A (B) is successful, it generates an overall beneﬁt of
size a > 0 (b > 0), which is distributed equally among all participating play-
ers. Players who do not participate in a successful project obtain a payoﬀ
of zero. Hence the payoﬀs are given by
πA(n) =
 
a/n if n ≥ nA,
0 if n < nA,
πB(n) =
 
0 if n > N − nB,
b/(N − n) if n ≤ N − nB.
The two proﬁles   A = (A,...,A) and   B = (B,...,B) are again strict Nash
equilibria, and states s ∈ S with N −nB +2 ≤ m(s) ≤ nA−2 are non-strict





a/n if nA ≤ n ≤ N,
0 if N − nB + 2 ≤ n ≤ nA − 1,
−b/(N − n + 1) if 1 ≤ n ≤ N − nB + 1.
The team project game becomes the unanimity game if nA = nB = N.9
9Maruta (2002) and Maruta and Okada (2009) generalize unanimity games to the
18We believe it to be commonly known that every symmetric binary action
game is an exact potential game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley
(1996). However, we are not aware of a formal statement of this fact in the
literature, so we present the result in the following lemma, together with a
straightforward potential function.10








∆(j) if m(s) ≥ 1,
0 if m(s) = 0.
(11)
Proof. See Appendix.
Exact potential games are relevant for the logit-response dynamics, which,
as mentioned in the introduction, selects the potential-maximizing states as
stochastically stable under certain assumptions. We will now introduce two
additional properties that will become crucial for the analysis of robust
stochastic stability: supermodularity and strategic complementarity (Top-
kis, 1998). To deﬁne supermodularity, we ﬁrst impose an order ≤ on the
strategy set {A,B} by deﬁning the convention B ≤ A. We then obtain a
partial order (also denoted ≤) on each of the sets S−i, by using the product
order derived from ≤.
Definition 8. Γ is supermodular if for each i ∈ I and all s−i,s′
−i ∈ S−i
with s−i ≤ s′
−i, it holds that
ui(A,s−i) − ui(B,s−i) ≤ ui(A,s′
−i) − ui(B,s′
−i). (12)
diﬀerent class of “binary coordination games” (see our discussion of Deﬁnition 8 below).
Our team project game is also related to the collective-action games studied by Myatt
and Wallace (2008a,b) for general quantal response dynamics under asynchronous learning
(and also simultaneous learning in Myatt and Wallace, 2008b). The games in Myatt and
Wallace (2008a,b) are not necessarily symmetric, they exhibit a single project only, and
all players obtain a positive payoﬀ if the project is successful.
10Maruta (2002) shows that symmetric binary coordination games are exact potential
games, with a potential function as given in (11). Myatt and Wallace (2008b) show that
their collective-action games are potential games under a symmetry condition, again with
a potential function similar to (11).
19Deﬁnition 8 is the standard deﬁnition that requires the individuals’ pay-
oﬀ functions to have increasing diﬀerences in (si,s−i). For symmetric binary
action games, it is easy to show that property (12) is equivalent to the dif-
ference function ∆(n) being weakly increasing in n (see Lemma 7 in the
Appendix). Such games are called binary coordination games by Maruta
(2002) and Maruta and Okada (2009).11 The unanimity game (Example 1)
is supermodular. Another example would be a population game where N
players are matched pairwise in a round-robin tournament to play a symmet-
ric 2×2 coordination game (see Section 5.3). Figure 1 depicts an exemplary
diﬀerence function ∆ of a supermodular game. As indicated in the ﬁgure,
we will denote by n the smallest value such that ∆(n) ≥ 0 for all n > n (and
hence ∆(n) < 0 for all n ≤ n). Analogously, we denote by n the largest
value such that ∆(n) ≤ 0 for all n ≤ n (and hence ∆(n) > 0 for all n > n).
If Γ is supermodular, only the monomorphic states   A = (A,...,A) or
  B = (B,...,B) can maximize the potential ρ. This is because the potential
of a state s is the sum of weakly increasing elements ∆(n) up to m(s), so
that only the states with m(s) = 0 or m(s) = N can be maximizers of ρ.12
Figure 1: Supermodularity
11Technically speaking, Maruta (2002) requires the diﬀerence function ∆ to be strictly
increasing. Maruta and Okada (2009) allow for games that are not necessarily symmetric.
12The case where ∆(n) = 0 for all 0 ≤ n ≤ N has been excluded by assumption.
20The team project game from Example 2 is not supermodular (except if
nA = nB = N so that it becomes the unanimity game), because ∆(n) is
decreasing from 1 to N −nB+1, and from nA to N. Still, the game satisﬁes
the weaker condition of strategic complementarity (see Vives, 2005).
Definition 9. Γ exhibits strategic complementarity if for each i ∈ I and
s−i ∈ S−i,




−i ∈ S−i with s−i ≤ s′
−i.
The deﬁnition is again standard, requiring best-responses to be weakly
increasing: if A is a best-response against s−i, then the same holds for any
s′
−i with s−i ≤ s′
−i. Conversely, condition (13) also implies that if B is a
best-response against s−i, it remains a best-response against any s′
−i ≤ s−i.
We can again give a characterization of strategic complementarity in terms
of the diﬀerence function: a symmetric binary action game exhibits strategic
complementarity if and only if two values n and n as described above do
exist, i.e. ∆(n) < 0 for all n ≤ n, ∆(n) ≥ 0 for all n > n, ∆(n) ≤ 0
for all n ≤ n and ∆(n) > 0 for all n > n. Thus any supermodular game
exhibits strategic complementarity, but the converse is not true. Figure 2
illustrates the case of a game that exhibits strategic complementarity but is
not supermodular.
Figure 2: Strategic Complementarity
21As before, observe that only the states   A = (A,...,A) or   B = (B,...,B)
can maximize the potential of a symmetric binary action game with strategic
complementarities.
5.2 Logit-Response
We now turn to the (best-reply based) logit-response dynamics for sym-
metric binary action games. An earlier result by Blume (1993, 1997) for the
class of exact potential games implies that the potential maximizing strategy
proﬁle will be stochastically stable under asynchronous learning. With the
potential function from Lemma 5, the diﬀerence in potential between two
states s and s′ corresponds to the accumulated utility changes of moving
asynchronously from s to s′. Moving towards a proﬁle with larger potential
is thus always easier under logit response, if only one player can update at
a time.
Consider the unanimity game in Example 1. We only need to compare
the value of the potential for   A and   B. Straightforward calculations reveal
that ρ(  B) = 0 and ρ(  A) = (a − b)/N, so that a project is stochastically
stable with asynchronous logit response if and only if it is Pareto eﬃcient.
We now want to examine under which conditions the selection of the
potential maximizer is robust. We apply Corollary 3 to obtain the following
result.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a supermodular symmetric binary action game. Then,
the potential maximizing states are robustly stochastically stable for the logit-
response dynamics.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is interesting in itself. The selection of potential maximizers
in exact potential games (Blume, 1993, 1997) has been shown to be knife-
edge by Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer (2010), in the sense that it neither holds
for general revision processes beyond asynchronous learning even for exact
potential games, nor for generalized potential games even for asynchronous
learning.13 For the particular class of N-player binary action games, The-
13Interestingly, however, Okada and Tercieux (2008) show that, under supermodularity,
22orem 1 shows that, if one additionally assumes supermodularity, potential
maximizers do become a robust prediction. Hence, the relevance of poten-
tial maximizers does extend beyond asynchronous learning, and the result
becomes a generalization of the original result by Blume (1993, 1997), at
the price of considering a smaller class of games.
Theorem 1 has a straightforward intuition. In supermodular games, the
waste of a non-best-reply, i.e. the absolute value of the diﬀerence between
its associated payoﬀ and that of the best-reply (see Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer,
2010), is decreasing in the number of opponents already choosing that non-
optimal action. Hence, with a logit choice rule, a player’s mistake becomes
more likely the more players have already made that mistake before. Mini-
mal waste paths in and out of the basin of attraction of an absorbing state are
therefore constructed by letting players switch sequentially, as under asyn-
chronous learning, so that stochastically stable states under asynchronous
learning are stochastically stable for any regular revision process.
The above mentioned selection of the Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium in the
unanimity game is therefore robust by its supermodularity property. The
result that the risk-dominant equilibrium of a symmetric 2 × 2 coordina-
tion game played in a round-robin tournament or on a (weighted) network
(Young, 1998b) will be selected by the logit dynamics is also robust due to
supermodularity. The same is true for the results that Maruta (2002) obtains
for binary coordination and hence supermodular games under asynchronous
logit response.
To investigate the case where supermodularity is not satisﬁed, we will
now analyze the team project game. Theorem 1 relies on the fact that, in
supermodular games, the basins of attraction become shallower with dis-
tance to the absorbing state, as illustrated in Figure 1. The opposite holds
in the team project game, where the basins do become deeper: leaving a
successful project is more damaging if there are fewer people active in the
project, and the beneﬁt has to be shared among a smaller number of people.
The property of deepening basins is illustrated in Figure 3, for a case with
N = 7,nA = 6,nB = 5 and a > b.
the asynchronous version of the logit-response dynamics selects local potential maximizers,
a generalization of potential maximizers.
23Figure 3: Team Project Game
First, the size of the basins does not depend on the speciﬁc (regular)
revision process. We can construct a zero waste path from state s to   B (to
  A) if and only if m(s) ≤ nA − 1 (respectively m(s) ≥ N − nB + 1), so that
B(  A) = {s ∈ S|m(s) ≥ N − nB + 1}
and
B(  B) = {s ∈ S|m(s) ≤ nA − 1}.
Consider asynchronous learning ﬁrst. We immediately obtain RqAL
(  A) =
CRqAL
(  B) = a
 N
j=nA 1/j and RqAL
(  B) = CRqAL
(  A) = b
 N
j=nB 1/j, by
adding the utility losses of moving through the basins one step at a time.
With independent learning, the waste of a transition that involves several
players changing their action simultaneously is the sum of individual myopic
utility losses. Thus whenever a basin of attraction becomes deeper as we
move away from the absorbing state, jumping directly out of the basin by
letting a suﬃcient number of players mutate simultaneously will cause a
smaller waste than a path of sequential mutations, where each step makes
the next one less likely. Leaving B(  A) like this requires N − nA − 1 players
to change actions simultaneously, each at a waste of a/N, so that we obtain
RqIL
(  A) = CRqIL
(  B) = (a/N)(N − nA + 1), and RqIL
(  B) = CRqIL
(  A) =
(b/N)(N − nB + 1) analogously. Based on these calculations, we can now
provide the following result.
24Proposition 3. Consider the team project game and the logit-response dy-
namics. Assume w.l.o.g. that nB ≤ nA. Then there exist critical values
ΛR,B ≤ ΛIL ≤ ΛAL ≤ ΛR,A (14)
such that state   A (  B, respectively) is
(i) stochastically stable with asynchronous learning iﬀ a/b ≥ (≤)ΛAL,
(ii) stochastically stable with independent learning iﬀ a/b ≥ (≤)ΛIL,
(iii) robustly stochastically stable if a/b > ΛR,A (a/b < ΛR,B).
The ﬁrst and third inequalities in (14) are strict if and only if nA < N.
The second inequality in (14) is strict if and only if nB < nA.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 4: Illustration of Proposition 3
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 4, for the case where nB < nA <
N, so that all inequalities in (14) are strict.
To make statements about stochastic stability, we need to compare the
ratio of project payoﬀs a/b to the respective critical values, which in turn
are the ratio of the appropriate radius and coradius terms. For instance, the
critical values ΛIL and ΛAL are given by
ΛIL =
N − nB + 1







as shown in the proof of the proposition. Hence the conditions for stochastic
stability under independent and asynchronous learning both reﬂect a trade-
oﬀ between a project’s payoﬀ and its participation requirement: larger pay-
oﬀs favor stochastic stability, and a large minimum number of participants
25works against it. If, for instance, the less resource intensive project B also
exhibits the larger payoﬀ (b > a), then we immediately obtain that   B is
stochastically stable for both qIL and qAL (because a/b < 1 ≤ ΛIL ≤ ΛAL).
The more interesting case arises if project A has a strict payoﬀ advan-
tage (a > b) while project B requires strictly fewer participants for suc-
cess (nA > nB). Then we have ΛIL < ΛAL, which implies that indepen-
dent learning is more likely to select the payoﬀ dominant project: whenever
ΛIL < a/b < ΛAL, the payoﬀ dominant state   A is already stochastically
stable with independent learning, but still   B under asynchronicity.14 Most
importantly, we do not have a robustly stochastically stable state in this
situation. Hence the team project game shows that Theorem 1 cannot be
generalized from supermodular games to the broader class of games with
strategic complements.
Proposition 3 still delivers suﬃcient conditions for robustness: the ad-
vantage of one project over the other has to be suﬃciently pronounced. State
  A, for example, is robustly stable if a/b > ΛR,A, which is illustrated by a
shaded gray area in Figure 4. The critical values for robustness are given by
ΛR,B =







N − nA + 1
,
which follows immediately from applying our robust radius-coradius result
from Corollary 3.
5.3 Mistakes Model
In this section, we examine robust stochastic stability for the mistakes model
based on a myopic best-reply dynamics. Hence we proceed in parallel to the
previous section for the logit-response dynamics, but, since the mistakes
model is a noise process that respects tie-breaking, we will also investigate
robustness with respect to tie-breaking assumptions, using Corollary 4.
Analyzing the team project game under asynchronous learning and cau-
tious tie-breaking is in fact straightforward. First, the size of the basins
14The reason is that the radius is linearly decreasing in the participation requirement
if learning is independent, but convex if learning is asynchronous. The relative advantage
of a smaller participation requirement is thus greater under asynchronous learning.
26of attraction remains exactly as before. To move out of B(  B) we need
N − nB + 1 consecutive costly mutations towards any state s with m(s) =
N −nB +1, which can then be connected to   A at zero cost. Hence we have
RB0,qAL
(  B) = CRB0,qAL
(  A) = N − nB + 1. Analogously, RB0,qAL
(  A) =
CRB0,qAL
(  B) = N − nA + 1. This implies that the project with smaller
participation requirement will be stochastically stable. Speciﬁcally, both A
and B are stochastically stable in the unanimity game, as already pointed
out by Young (1998a), so that the asynchronous mistakes model cannot
distinguish between the two projects.15 As it turns out, these ﬁndings for
the team project game are robust due to the fact that the game exhibits
strategic complementarity.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a symmetric binary action game with strategic com-
plementarity. Consider the proﬁle of best-reply correspondences   BBR =
(   BBR
i )i∈I. Then,   A is robustly stochastically stable for   BBR and the mis-
takes model if and only if n+n ≤ N, and   B is robustly stochastically stable
if and only if n + n ≥ N.
Proof. See Appendix.
Compared to the logit-response dynamics, the mistakes model requires
only the weaker property of strategic complementarity for robustness of its
selection result in symmetric binary action games. Strategic complementar-
ity implies that the basin of attraction of each monomorphic state contains
in its interior no area where the unperturbed dynamics would lead away
from the monomorphic state, and thus it suﬃces to compare the size of the
basins, irrespective of the speciﬁc regular revision process and tie-breaking
assumptions. In this sense, the mistakes model is more robust than the
logit-response dynamics, delivering robust selection results for a larger class
of games. The reason is, of course, that it makes use of the payoﬀ structure
of the game to a lesser extent.
As an immediate application, we obtain the robustness of a classical
selection result.
15See Maruta and Okada (2009) for a treatment of generalized, asymmetric unanimity
games under perturbed adaptive play as in Young (1993).
27Corollary 6. Consider a symmetric 2 × 2 coordination game played in a
round-robin tournament. For myopic best-reply and the mistakes model, co-
ordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium is robustly stochastically stable.
Similarly, the comparable results of Maruta and Okada (2009) for the sym-
metric case are robust due to strategic complementarity of their binary co-
ordination games.
We want to conclude this section by presenting an example without
strategic complementarity, in which the mistakes model’s selection is in fact
not robust. Consider a game with diﬀerence function as displayed in Figure
5. Clearly, strategic complementarity fails, because we have ui(A,s−i) <




−i with m(A,s−i) = 2 and hence s−i ≤ s′
−i.
Figure 5: Non-Complementarity
With asynchronous learning, leaving   B requires 3 mutations. After an
initial mutation, a second player can switch to A at zero cost, but two addi-
tional mutations become necessary afterwards.   A can be left with only two
mutations, so that   B is stochastically stable. With independent learning,
however,   B can be left with only one mutation. After reaching a state s
with m(s) = 1, all remaining B-players are (myopically) indiﬀerent between
A and B, and the basin of attraction of   B can be left without additional
cost whenever at least 3 of them switch actions simultaneously. Hence   A
is stochastically stable. The diﬀerence between the two revision processes
arises because the basin of attraction of   B contains states in its interior
28where the unperturbed dynamics no longer gravitates back to   B. Simulta-
neous mutations then allow for direct and costless jumps out of the basin.
6 Limitations of the Approach
Radius-coradius results are suﬃcient conditions. Our approach shares this
limitation with previous results. In some cases, this is not an issue. For
instance, in the team project game, standard radius-coradius approaches
are always able to identify the stochastically stable state (except for the
non-generic case where both   A and   B are stable). However, in general there
might be cases where robustly stochastically states cannot be identiﬁed by
applying Corollaries 3 or 4.
Corollary 3 asserts that a state is robustly stochastically stable for some
noisy behavioral rule proﬁle Bε if its radius under independent learning is
larger than its coradius under asynchronous learning, RqIL
(s) > CRqAL
(s).
This is not the same as being stochastically stable for both independent and





Robustness is stronger as it requires stochastic stability also for all inter-
mediate regular revision processes. In the following example we want to
illustrate that a state can be stochastically stable for both independent and
asynchronous learning, but fail to be stochastically stable for all regular re-
vision processes. For this purpose, we again use the logit-response dynamics.
Figure 6: Example 3
29Example 3. Consider a symmetric binary action game with N = 7 and
diﬀerence function ∆(n) as given in Figure 6. If learning is asynchronous
and −[∆(1)+∆(2)+∆(3)] < [∆(5)+∆(6)+∆(7)], then   A is stochastically
stable because the utility losses of moving out of B(  B) are strictly smaller
than those of leaving B(  A). If learning is independent and −∆(1) < ∆(7),
the same is true because leaving B(  A) causes a waste of 3∆(7) while leaving
B(  B) causes only −3∆(1).
But now consider a regular revision process q ∈ Q where q{1,2} > 0
and qJ = 0 for all other J ⊆ I with |J| ≥ 2. Under the assumption
that −∆(2) < −[∆(1) + ∆(3)]/2, a minimal waste path out of B(  B) is
constructed by letting a single player, say player 3, switch to A ﬁrst, followed
by a simultaneous switch of players 1 and 2.16 The waste associated to this
path is Rq(  B) = CRq(  A) = −[∆(1) + 2∆(2)]. If ∆(6) < [∆(5) + ∆(7)]/2,
the minimal waste path out of B(  A) has the analogous updating structure,
leading to Rq(  A) = CRq(  B) = [∆(7) +2∆(6)]. Now consider a game where
∆(1) = −1,∆(2) = −10,∆(3) = −20,∆(5) = 20,∆(6) = 7,∆(7) = 5,
which satisﬁes all above assumptions. Then Rq(  B) = 21 > 19 = CRq(  B).
Hence   B is stochastically stable under q, so that   A is not robustly stochas-
tically stable, despite being stochastically stable under both asynchronous
and independent learning.
In view of the last example, we want to conclude this section by dis-
cussing the tightness of our suﬃcient conditions for robustness. Recall the
analysis of team project games in Proposition 3. We are not allowed to con-
clude that, for instance, the bound ΛR,A is not tight because ΛAL < ΛR,A
when nA < N. In fact, conditions that are both suﬃcient and necessary for
robust stochastic stability are out of reach already in this rather simple class
of games. Instead, we will show that our suﬃcient radius-coradius condition
16Since the basin of attraction is deepening with distance to   B, the simultaneous switch
of players 1 and 2 must clearly be used in a minimal waste path that leaves B(  B). The
only question is whether the two simultaneous strategy changes should occur right in
the beginning, leading to overall waste −[2∆(1) + ∆(3)], or in step 2, leading to waste
−[∆(1) + 2∆(2)]. The latter expression is smaller whenever −∆(2) < −[∆(1) + ∆(3)]/2.
30is tight in some but not in other cases. First, when nA = N, then the suﬃ-
cient condition is tight, because ΛR,B = ΛIL and ΛAL = ΛR,A according to
Proposition 3. State   A, for instance, is then robustly stable if a/b > ΛR,A,
but not if a/b < ΛR,A. On the other hand, our condition will not be tight
if nB = nA < N and a > b. For this speciﬁc parameter constellation, it
is straightforward to verify (see Lemma 8 in the Appendix) that   A is not
only stochastically stable under asynchronous and independent learning but
in fact robustly stochastically stable. However, we have ΛAL = 1 < ΛR,A
according to Proposition 3. Then, when ΛAL ≤ a/b ≤ ΛR,A, we are in a sit-
uation where our approach is not able to identify the robustly stochastically
stable state, although it exists.
7 Conclusion
Stochastic stability is and remains an important concept in Game Theory.
Unfortunately, it is sometimes too ﬂexible a concept, and diﬀerent assump-
tions might lead to diﬀerent results. In our view, stochastic stability is
well suited to analyze questions of outcome selection in noisy environments,
as long as the diﬀerent ingredients of the model are clearly diﬀerentiated.
Ideally, a strong, clearcut result is one linking a particular behavioral as-
sumption (captured by a behavioral rule or correspondence) under a partic-
ular interaction structure (as a proxy for the socioeconomic setting, e.g. the
network structure) to the selection of a particular outcome.
Failing that, of course more subtle elements of the model might have an
inﬂuence on long-run outcomes, and it is still important to understand the
reasons behind this inﬂuence. However, we should be careful with results
which depend crucially on modeling assumptions such as revision opportuni-
ties or tie-breaking assumptions, unless there is a clear interpretation thereof
in the problem at hand. Our concept of robust stochastic stability aims to
diﬀerentiate clearcut predictions from more subtle ones. For noisy behav-
ioral rules where speciﬁc tie-breaking assumptions are built into the rule,
as in the case of logit choice, robust stochastic stability requires robustness
with respect to the speed of the dynamics, as captured by the speciﬁcation
of revision opportunities. For noisy behavioral rules which remain silent
31(or are less vocal) on the issue of tie-breaking, as e.g. those based on the
mistakes model, robustness should also include the latter.
We have provided an easy-to-use suﬃcient condition for robust stochas-
tic stability, and have illustrated its application for diﬀerent games and
dynamics. The condition makes use of an order structure of the space of
dynamics, by observing that the radius and coradius concepts introduced in
the literature are monotone operators in this space. Our result itself reduces
to a radius-coradius approach, with the diﬀerence that the radius is taken
with respect to the “quickest” dynamics (independent learning and random
tie-breaking) and the coradius is taken with respect to the “slowest” one
(asynchronous learning and cautious tie-breaking). It is interesting to ob-
serve that, in the quest to obtain results which are independent of certain
parts of the speciﬁcation of the dynamics, we are led to concentrate on these
two particular, extreme dynamics.
In our applications, we have found that both the celebrated selection
of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under noisy best-reply
(Kandori and Rob, 1995; Sandholm, 1998) and the selection of “Walrasian”
strategies in aggregative games under noisy imitation (Vega-Redondo, 1997;
Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005) turn out to be robust. The selection of poten-
tial maximizers in exact potential games under the logit-response dynamics
(Blume, 1993, 1997), shown to be generally non-robust by Al´ os-Ferrer and
Netzer (2010), turns out to be robust for the subclass of supermodular,
N-player binary-action games. Best-reply with mistakes delivers robust se-
lection results in the same class of games under the weaker condition of
strategic complementarity. These results, which illustrate the usefulness of
our main result, are also of independent interest for the literature of learning
in games.
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Proof of Lemma 5. We verify that ρ is a potential for Γ. From (9) and (10)
we obtain that for each i ∈ I and s−i ∈ S−i,
πi(A,s−i) − πi(B,s−i) = πA(m(A,s−i)) − πB(m(B,s−i)) = ∆(m(A,s−i)),
because m(B,s−i) = m(A,s−i) − 1. For the same reason, it follows from
(11) that
ρ(A,s−i) − ρ(B,s−i) = ∆(m(A,s−i)),
which veriﬁes that ρ is a potential.
Lemma 7. For symmetric binary action games, property (12) holds if and
only if the diﬀerence function ∆(n) is weakly increasing in n.
Proof. Assume ﬁrst that ∆ is weakly increasing. Consider any player i ∈ I
and proﬁles s−i,s′
−i ∈ S−i with s−i ≤ s′
−i. From the deﬁnition of the product
order on S−i it follows that m(A,s−i) ≤ m(A,s′
−i). Thus ∆(m(A,s−i)) ≤
∆(m(A,s′
−i)), which is equivalent to condition (12), implying that Γ is su-
permodular.
Next assume that ∆ is not weakly increasing, i.e. there exist values
1 ≤ n < n′ ≤ N such that ∆(n) > ∆(n′). Fix any player i ∈ I and consider
the proﬁles s−i = (A, n−1 ...,A,B, N−n ... ,B) and s′
−i = (A, n′−1 ... ,A,B, N−n′ ... ,B).
By construction, s−i ≤ s′
−i and m(A,s−i) = n < n′ = m(A,s′
−i). Then,
∆(m(A,s−i)) > ∆(m(A,s′
−i)), which contradicts (12) and implies that Γ is
not supermodular.
Proof of Theorem 1. We will rely on Corollary 3 and radius-coradius from
Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer (2010). Let n and n be as given in the text. Since
∆(n) is weakly increasing in n (supermodularity), n and n do exist and
n ≤ n holds.
Fix an arbitrary regular revision process q ∈ Q. The waste caused by a
single player switching from B to A in the presence of n other A-players is
max{−∆(n + 1),0} and hence zero if and only if n ≥ n. Analogously, the
waste that is generated if one of n A-players switches to B is max{∆(n),0}
33and zero if and only if n ≤ n. We can thus construct zero waste paths
from any s to   B (to   A) if m(s) ≤ n (or m(s) ≥ n, respectively), letting
one player switch at a time. On the other hand, for any s with m(s) > n
(with m(s) < n), any switch to B (to A) causes strictly positive waste,
irrespective of the speciﬁc revising set chosen. The basins of attraction (of
the unperturbed best-reply dynamics) are thus B(  B) = {s ∈ S|m(s) ≤ n}
and B(  A) = {s ∈ S|m(s) ≥ n}, for any regular process q ∈ Q.
Now consider asynchronous learning and ﬁx some s′ / ∈ B(  B). Construct
a minimal waste path P = (s′,...,   B) by letting A-players switch to B sequen-
tially. We obtain the waste W(P) =
 m(s′)
j=n+1 ∆(j). Since ∆(n) is positive
for all n ≥ n + 1, this expression is maximal if s′ =   A so that m(s′) = N,
which yields CRqAL
(  B) =
 N
j=n+1 ∆(j). From analogous arguments we
obtain CRqAL
(  A) = −
 n
j=1 ∆(j).
Now consider independent learning. Since ∆(n) is increasing in n due
to supermodularity, the waste caused by a B-player switching to A in the
presence of n A-players (max{−∆(n+1),0}) is decreasing in n. Analogously,
the waste of an A-player switching to B (max{∆(n),0}) is increasing. Hence
the waste caused by several players switching simultaneously is weakly larger
than the waste caused by sequential switching, so that among minimal waste
paths out of B(  B) and B(  A), there are always paths that make use of
sequential revisions only. This immediately implies
RqIL
















Now suppose   B is the unique potential maximizer, i.e.
 N
j=1 ∆(j) < 0.




j=n+1 ∆(j), because ∆(n) = 0
for all n < n ≤ n. This is equivalent to RqIL
(  B) > CRqAL
(  B) and implies
that   B is the unique robustly stochastically stable state by Corollary 3. The
argument for   A is analogous.
If both   A and   B maximize the potential (
 N
j=1 ∆(j) = 0), our robust
radius-coradius result is not applicable. From the previous arguments about
34supermodularity it is still true that minimal waste revision trees can be con-
structed using singleton revising sets only. Hence the stochastically stable
states for any regular revision process must be the same as for asynchronous
learning, and thus the potential maximizers.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Asynchronous Learning. RqAL
(  A) > CR
qAL
L (  A)




j=nA 1/j) =: ΛAL, so that   A
is stochastically stable under asynchronous learning if a/b > ΛAL. Analo-
gously,   B is stochastically stable if a/b < ΛAL. If RqAL
(  A) = CR
qAL
L (  A),
so a/b = ΛAL, it follows immediately that the stochastic potential (again,
see Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer, 2010) of both   A and   B is identical and both are
stochastically stable.
(ii) Independent Learning. The proof is analogous, using RqIL
and CRqIL
instead, which yields the critical value ΛIL := (N − nB + 1)/(N − nA + 1).
(iii) Robust Stochastic Stability. Corollary 3 implies that   A is robustly
stochastically stable if RqIL
(  A) > CRqAL
(  A), which can be rearranged to
a/b > (N
 N
j=nB 1/j)/(N − nA + 1) =: ΛR,A. Analogously,   B is robustly
stochastically stable if a/b < (N − nB + 1)/(N
 N
j=nA 1/j) =: ΛR,B.
Ranking of ΛIL and ΛAL. If nA = nB, then ΛAL = ΛIL = 1 holds.
Suppose then that nB < nA. Condition ΛAL > ΛIL can be rearranged to











Deﬁne δ(nA,nB) := γ(nA + 1,nB) − γ(nA,nB) as the change of γ if nA is































Since γ(n,n) = 0 holds, and nA > nB by assumption, we can write nA =
nB + x, x > 0, and
γ(nA,nB) = γ(nB + x,nB) =
x−1  
i=0













35where the second equality follows from iterating the diﬀerences δ, and the








































































where the ﬁrst equality follows after separating the summands, the second
equality follows by breaking the sums with index j into two partial sums
each, and the third equality follows from redeﬁning indices. Now observe
that, in the resulting expression, the ﬁrst and the third double-sum are














First, the sums in (A3) are not empty, because x ≥ 1 and nB+x = nA ≤ N.
But then (A3) is strictly positive, because in each summand i < x and
nB ≤ j holds, so that each summand is strictly positive. Hence ΛAL > ΛIL.






j=nA N/N = N −nA +1, with strict inequality if and only














with strict inequality if and only if nA < N. By the same argument, ΛR,B ≤
ΛIL, again with strict inequality if and only if nA < N.
Proof of Theorem 2. We will rely on Corollary 4 and radius-coradius from
Ellison (2000). Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 1, the basins of attraction
for a symmetric binary action game with strategic complementarity and
hence well-deﬁned values n and n, are given by B(  B) = {s ∈ S|m(s) ≤ n}
and B(  A) = {s ∈ S|m(s) ≥ n}, for any regular process q ∈ Q.
36Consider asynchronous learning, ﬁx any s′ / ∈ B(  B), and construct a min-
imal cost path P = (s′,...,   B) by letting A-players switch to B sequentially.
Note that this transition path is unaﬀected by tie-breaking considerations.
The cost of this path is C(P) = m(s′) − n, which is maximal if s′ =   A so
that m(s′) = N, and we thus have CRB0,qAL
(  B) = N − n. We analogously
obtain CRB0,qAL
(  A) = n.
Now consider independent learning. The fact that n players have to
mutate to eventually leave B(  B) is unaﬀected by the possibility that some
mutations could occur simultaneously (and analogously for B(  A), where
N−n mutations need to occur). Again, note that tie-breaking considerations
are not relevant for this argument. Hence we obtain RBX,qIL
(  B) = n and
RBX,qIL
(  A) = N − n.
Now suppose n+n > N. This is identical to RBX,qIL
(  B) > CRB0,qAL
(  B)
and implies that   B is the unique robustly stochastically stable state by
Corollary 4. The same holds for   A if n + n < N.
If n + n = N, our approach is again not applicable. The previous argu-
ments, however, imply that both   A and   B have minimal stochastic potential
in this case (see Kandori and Rob, 1995), under any regular revision process
und tie-breaking assumption, so that both are robustly stable.
Lemma 8. Consider the team project game and the logit-response dynamics.
If nB = nA < N and a > b,   A is robustly stochastically stable.
Proof. Following the general approach from Al´ os-Ferrer and Netzer (2010)
for ﬁnding stochastically stable states of the logit-response dynamics, let
q ∈ Q be an arbitrary regular revision process and (T,γ) a minimum waste
  B revision-tree under q. Then the tree T contains a path P = (s1,...,sn)
where s1 =   A and sn =   B, and which satisﬁes that W(P,γ|P) = W(T,γ).
Here, γ|P denotes the restriction of γ to P. Clearly W(P,γ|P) ≤ W(T,γ)
must hold, since the revision path (P,γ|P) is a part of (T,γ). Since any state
s that is not on P can be connected to either   A or   B at zero waste, with the
help of singleton revising sets, and (T,γ) is a minimal waste revision-tree by
assumption, we must have W(P,γ|P) = W(T,γ).
We can now construct an inverted path P′ = (s′
1,...,s′
n) where s′
1 =   B
37and s′
n =   A, together with a revision selection γ′|P ′ by using the same re-
vising sets in the same order as before, i.e. γ′|P ′(s′
j,s′
j+1) = γ|P(sj,sj+1)
for all j = 1,...,n − 1, and by letting the same players switch to the op-










j+1)) = W((sj,sj+1),γ|P(sj,sj+1)) = 0 other-
wise, because nA = nB. Hence W(P′,γ′|P ′) < W(P,γ|P). Connecting all
states which are not on P′ to either   A or   B within singleton revising sets at
zero waste yields a revision   A-tree (T′,γ′) with W(T′,γ′) < W(T,γ), which
implies that   A is stochastically stable under (any) q ∈ Q.
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